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THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES THE WIND OUT OF FRIVOLOUS LITIGATORS’
SAILS IN FAIR WIND SAILING, INC. V. DEMPSTER

TRAVIS DUNKELBERGER*
“The U.S. has more costs of litigation per person than any other industrialized
nation in the world, and it is crippling our economy.” 1

I.

LEARNING THE ROPES: DETERMINING ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION

$700,000. According to a 2007 survey, this figure represents the average
cost incurred by parties litigating trade dress claims. 2 Unsurprisingly, this high
price has a huge impact on whether companies are capable of defending—or
even initiating—trade dress claims.3 For some, these numbers could mean
risking the entire company’s viability for the sake of protecting its trade dress
rights.4 Such risk comes with a silver lining, however, as litigants may seek
*
J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2012, The
Pennsylvania State University.
1. JEFFREY H. CORBETT & PATRICK J. KISH, BEHIND THE OFFSHORE VEIL 165
(quoting U.S. Rep. Jack Kingston) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See David Pardue, Wisconsin Court of Appeals Determines That the Glove Fits:
Trade Dress Suit Was a Covered Advertising Injury Claim Triggering Duty to Defend, TRADE
SECRETS
&
IP
TODAY
(Apr.
16,
2012,
11:39
AM),
http://tradesecretstoday.blogspot.com/2012/04/wisconsin-cout-of-appeals-determines.html
[http://perma.cc/JJS6-MNK8] (referencing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT
OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2007)).
3. See, e.g., Ashlee Kieler, Deal with Hershey’s Puts an End to Import of Cadbury
Chocolates, CONSUMERIST (Jan. 26, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/01/26/deal-withhersheys-puts-an-end-to-import-of-cadbury-chocolates/ [http://perma.cc/5DEB-P5P7] (“It is
important for Hershey to protect its trademark rights and to prevent consumers from being
confused or misled when they see a product name or product package that is confusingly
similar to a Hershey name or trade dress.” (quoting Jeff Beckman, Hershey representative)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The lawsuit by Hershey prohibits the import of Britishproduced Cadbury Chocolate and threatens to put businesses that sell those products out of
business. See Parija Kavilanz, Trademark Wars Heat Up. Be Ready., CNNMONEY (Dec. 1,
2011,
11:50
AM)
http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/01/smallbusiness/trademark/
[http://perma.cc/25YQ-UA2K] (examining manner in which trade dress litigation can
substantially affect small businesses). Matthew Swyers, founder of the Trademark Company,
offered advice on costs to potential litigants stating “[I]f [litigation] fees start exceeding your
returns, maybe it’s better to settle and change the trademark and still keep the business.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See, e.g., Ryan Richardson, Apple v. Samsung: Tech Trial of the Century, ILL. BUS.
L.J. (Feb. 8, 2014) http://www.law.illinois.edu/bljournal/post/2014/02/08/Apple-v-SamsungTech-Trial-of-the-Century [http://perma.cc/EXV9-SDWG] (explaining lawsuit over trademark
and trade dress between Apple and Samsung). In 2012, a jury found that Samsung weakened

(121)
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attorneys’ fees against frivolous claims to help recoup expenditures associated
with trade dress lawsuits.5
Even for successful litigants, winning the suit does not automatically
guarantee the court will award attorneys’ fees. 6 Until 2014, trade dress litigants
in the Third Circuit could only recover attorneys’ fees if the court found the
case to be “exceptional” after application of a two-step process.7 This
fee-assessment method—which the court applied restrictively, awarding fees in
only narrow, limited circumstances—considered (1) whether the parties
exhibited culpable conduct; and (2) whether the culpable conduct was
exceptional under the Lanham Act.8
The Third Circuit, however, steered away from its restrictive standard in
Fair Wind Sailing v. Dempster9 and instead adopted a broader definition of
exceptional for trade dress claims under the Lanham Act. 10 In Fair Wind

the trade dress of Apple products and ordered Samsung to pay $1.05 billion dollars in
damages. See id. However, due to technical issues with the jury’s calculations, a new trial
was set with both parties seeking adjustments to the amount. See id. Despite Samsung
remaining in business, the case demonstrates the huge risks associated with litigating trade
dress rights. See, e.g., Kavilanz, supra note 3 (describing risks inherent in trademark dress
matters).
5. See Sharad K. Bijanki, Note, Redefining Attorney-Fee Shifting Under the Lanham
Act: Protecting Small Businesses and Deterring Trademark Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV.
809, 811 (2013) (“By shifting litigation costs, the attorney-fee-shifting provision promotes
enforcement by trademark holders and discourages trademark infringers.”).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”). By using a term as broad as exceptional,
the Lanham Act creates some consistency issues as the different federal circuits apply varying
standards. See Richard J. Leighton, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in “Exceptional” Lanham Act
Cases: A “Jumble” of “Murky” Law, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 849, 881 (2012) (discussing
inconsistencies in application of “bad faith” standard in Lanham Act cases).
7. See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2014).
First, the District Court must decide whether the defendant engaged in any
culpable conduct. We have listed bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing
infringement as non-exclusive examples of the sort of culpable conduct that could
support a fee award. Moreover, the culpable conduct may relate not only to the
circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but also to the way the losing party
handled himself during the litigation. Second, if the District Court finds culpable
conduct, it must decide whether the circumstances are “exceptional” enough to
warrant a fee award.
Id. (quoting Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir.2007)). The two-step analysis from
Green was used by the Third Circuit to “find culpability before awarding attorneys’ fees under
the Lanham Act” for the past twenty years. See id.
8. See Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47, 48 (3d Cir. 1991)
(noting failure of lower court to articulate “explicit finding” that other party “acted willfully or
in bad faith” before awarding fees), abrogated by Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir.
2014). The court in Ferrero found awarding attorney fees appropriate only in cases that
“involve[d] deliberate attempts by the defendant to pass off its goods as those of the plaintiff
by applying plaintiff’s trademark to defendant’s goods.” See id. at 48–49.
9. 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014).
10. See id. (importing alternative meaning of exceptional to assess attorneys’ fees in
trademark claim); see also id. at 315 (remanding for district court’s determination on whether
plaintiff’s claim was exceptional and required attorneys’ fees to be awarded). The Third
Circuit provided some guidelines by finding the court “may award fees as a result of either the
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Sailing, the Third Circuit imported the definition from a different intellectual
property context, relying on the leading Supreme Court precedent in Octane
Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness,11 a patent law case.12 Notwithstanding the
involvement of patent law, the Third Circuit determined Octane Fitness’s
approach created a more effective policy regarding attorneys’ fees. 13 As a
result, the Third Circuit’s broader interpretation of exceptional integrates
different areas of intellectual property law to reduce frivolous litigation of
meritless trade dress claims.14
This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit’s new interpretation of
exceptional, which increases the likelihood of awarding attorneys’ fees under
the Lanham Act and addresses the benefits that accompany the court’s
willingness to import features from other areas of intellectual property law. 15
Part II discusses the Lanham Act and the development of awarding attorneys’
fees in the federal courts, and more recently, in the Third Circuit. 16 Part III
examines the Third Circuit’s decision in Fair Wind Sailing and focuses on the
court’s reasoning for applying an alternative meaning of exceptional in the
context of trademark claims.17 Part IV discusses the use of sanctions and feeshifting provisions to provide financial relief for litigants. 18 Part V provides a
guide for practitioners to avoid fee-shifting provisions by structuring trade dress

circumstances of the Lanham Act violation or the way in which [they] litigated the claim.”
See id. (citing Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2007)).
11. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014)
12. See id. 1756–57 (redefining exceptional to determine whether attorneys’ fees
should be awarded in Patent Act cases); id. at 1756 (noting fee-shifting provisions in both
Patent Act and Lanham Act contained identical language regarding attorneys’ fees (citing
Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985))). The
Supreme Court also removed the clear and convincing evidence standard for parties seeking
attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act. See id. at 1758.
13. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 314–15 (taking guidance from Supreme Court’s
interpretation of § 285 of Patent Act, which addresses awarding attorneys’ fees in exceptional
cases).
14. See id. (acknowledging new meaning of exceptional was imported from different
area of intellectual property law). Although patent and trademark claims are litigated under
separate Acts, the identical statutory language in each Act’s attorneys’ fees provision allowed
the court to apply the new, Patent-Act meaning of exceptional to the Lanham Act. See id. at
315 (“We believe that the Court was sending a clear message that it was defining
‘exceptional’ not just for the fee provision in the Patent Act, but for the fee provision in the
Lanham Act as well.”).
15. See id. at 315 (explaining that Congress referenced § 285 while passing Lanham
Act); see also S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 7133 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132,
7133 (“[A]lthough the patent law and the copyright law provide for reasonable attorney fees,
this remedy is not now available in the trademark area. The Department of Commerce
believes and the Committee agrees that the remedy should be available in exceptional
cases . . . .”).
16. For a discussion of the Lanham Act and development of awarding attorneys’ fees
in exceptional cases, see infra notes 25–57 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision to adopt a new meaning of
exceptional, see infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of motions for sanctions and fee-shifting provisions as avenues for
recovering court costs, see infra notes 97–120 and accompanying text.
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claims properly.19 Finally, Part VI concludes that Fair Wind Sailing
demonstrates the unique ability of intellectual property to blend different areas
of
the
law
together.20

II.

BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES: COURTS ROCK THE BOAT BY
BROADENING FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS

To understand the significance of Fair Wind Sailing’s expansive standard,
it is important to consider the development of the term exceptional in the
broader context of intellectual property law. 21 First, the Lanham Act,
specifically Section 35(a), is discussed to explain its impact on trade dress
claims by allowing courts to award attorneys’ fees to successful parties in
litigation.22 Second, a comparative overview of the Patent Act—most notably
Section 285—is provided to demonstrate its role in shaping fee-shifting
provisions within the Third Circuit.23 Finally, consideration is given to the
court’s redefining of the term exceptional to allow for greater recovery of
attorneys’ fees, and the impact it will have on intellectual property claims
moving forward.24

A. The Lanham Act: An Anchor for Trade Dress Claims
Trade dress claims involve disputes over a product’s physical appearance,
the way the product is presented or promoted, or the product’s involvement with
marketing strategies.25 These claims generally are brought when “the trade
dress of two businesses is sufficiently similar to cause confusion among
consumers,” and they are litigated under the Lanham Act, which regulates the

19. For a discussion of Fair Wind Sailing’s impact on practitioners and guidance for
litigating trade dress clams, see infra notes 121–42 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 143–45.
21. For a further discussion on the development of exceptional as it relates to awarding
attorneys’ fees in patent and trademark claims, see infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text.
22. See Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (providing cause of action in
trade dress claims).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (permitting attorneys’ fees remedy in patent claims).
24. For a further discussion of the term exceptional as it relates to Third Circuit
jurisprudence, see infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
25. See Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Trade
dress has been defined as the total image or overall appearance of a product, and includes, but
is not limited to, such features as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or
even a particular sales technique.”); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 768 (1992) (“A trademark . . . includ[es] ‘any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof’ used by any person ‘to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)).
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use of trademarks in commercial activity. 26
Created in 1946, the Lanham Act established a cause of action for trade
dress infringement.27 Most notably, Section 43(a) includes protection for a
party’s “trade dress,” which “has been defined as the total image or overall
appearance of a product, and includes, but is not limited to, such features as
size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, [or] graphics . . . .” 28 Trade
dress may be anything from distinctive restaurant décor to the shape of various
beverage bottles.29 The purpose of trade dress protection is to “secure the
26.
See
Trade
Dress,
THEFREEDICTIONARY,
http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Trade+dress [http://perma.cc/C5Y5-DJ65] (last visited Nov.
4, 2015) (defining trade dress and describing basic trade dress claims); see also Lauren Krohn,
Causes of Action for Trade Dress Infringement Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act [15 USC §
1125(a)], 7 CAUSES ACTION 2d 725 (1995) (detailing trade dress claims under Lanham Act
provisions). In order to establish a prima facie case in an action under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act the plaintiff must first show that: “The plaintiff has a protectable interest in its trade dress
design, which will be established by evidence that the design (a) is inherently distinctive or (b)
is at least descriptive and has acquired secondary meaning among consumers, and (c) is not
functional.” See id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff must then show “[t]he defendant’s use
of a similar trade dress design is likely to cause confusion among consumers as to the source
of the parties’ goods or services.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (“The Lanham Act provides for the registration
of trademarks, which it defines in § 45 to include ‘any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof [used or intended to be used] to identify and distinguish [a producer’s]
goods’ . . . .” (alterations in original)). Some examples of distinctive trademarks include
Nike’s “swoosh” symbol in the clothing industry and “Tide” laundry detergent or “Camel”
cigarettes in brand marketing. See Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. at 210 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (detailing causes of action for trade dress claims). Created
in 1946, the Lanham Act was “enacted by Congress [] based on the power granted to it by the
See
Lanham
Act,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
Commerce
Clause.”
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act [https://perma.cc/6ESH-X7CY] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2015).
28. See Sweet St. Desserts, Inc. v. Chudleigh’s Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 3d 530, 540 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing types of trade dress that are protected
under Lanham Act). “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act [also] prohibits the use of ‘any word,
term, name, symbol, or device . . .’ that is ‘likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods.’” Id. (third
alteration in original) (citation omitted).
29. See Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. Tex.
1984) (detailing trade dress features of popular restaurant chain), aff’d, 783 F.2d 1062 (5th
Cir. 1986).
[A]n exposed glassed-in butcher shop for meat preparation, which includes an area
for hanging beef and for cutting and processing beef; a beef showcase; an exposed
on-premises bakery for the preparation of bread and dessert products; a bakery
showcase for the bakery products; a fresh vegetable condiment island with stacked
vegetables, in part, in original shipping cartons; an open display of bags of
potatoes, onions, flour and sugar; cases of beverages stacked to form aisleways and
tables; the extensive use of white tile on counters and walls; dark brown and white
checkerboard asbestos tile flooring; and interior green bands of neon lights and
neon beer signs.
Id.; see also Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 1958 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 89 (finding shape and style
of glass bottle to be properly labeled as trade dress of scotch liquor company); see also Two
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765–67 (noting jury finding in district court that trade dress claim exists
because of unique theme of restaurant décor). The restaurant chain in Two Pesos had a
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owner of the [trade dress] the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability
of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” 30
In order to prevail in a trade dress infringement case a plaintiff must prove
three elements: “(1) the allegedly infringing design is non-functional; (2) the
design is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning; and (3)
consumers are likely to confuse the source of the plaintiff's product with that of
the defendant's product.”31
B. Same Ocean, Different Tides: Courts Provide Direction for Litigants
Seeking Attorneys’ Fees
Because enforcing trade dress rights is expensive, some jurisdictions allow
fee-shifting provisions to offset the risks of bringing a claim. 32 The Third
Circuit has historically allowed fee-shifting through contractual provisions and
statutes such as the Lanham Act.33 However, in earlier cases, the Third Circuit
“festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts,
bright colors, paintings and murals.” See id. at 765 (quoting Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two
Pesos, Inc., 923 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
appellate court emphasized the visual aspects of the restaurant chain, including the “vivid
color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes” and “[b]right awnings and umbrellas
[to] continue the theme.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See Shire U.S., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration
in original) (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting
similarity between trademark rights and patent protection). However, the Shire court
distinguished trade dress protection from patent protection because trade dress “does not
foster innovation by preventing reverse engineering or copying of innovative product design
features.” See id. The court understood the reality that “there is no prohibition against
copying goods and products.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “‘[t]rade
dress’ refers to the design or packaging of a product which serves to identify the product’s
source.” See id.
31. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 357 (3d
Cir. 2007) (laying out framework for assessing trade dress infringement claim); see also
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 2001) (allowing
trade dress claim to survive summary judgment when business’s nonfunctional features were
unique to industry). In Clicks, the Ninth Circuit allowed separate functional features to
aggregate into trade dress infringement when, taken as a whole, the “composite tapestry of
visual effects” was unique to a certain industry or business. See Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d at
1259, 1260–61. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing relevant framework for trade
dress claims).
32. See Bijanki, supra note 5, at 817 (highlighting circuit split on application of
exceptional standard under Lanham Act). The language in the Lanham Act is deceptively
simple. See id. Application of the standard, on the other hand, has been unclear, and the
federal circuits are deeply split on the requisite showing to prove exceptionality under the Act.
See id. At least six circuit courts require the moving party to prove a bad faith requirement
before allowing fee-shifting. See id. at 817–19. Six other circuits do not require the plaintiff
to demonstrate the defendant’s bad faith or fraud, but rather consider both as factors in
awarding fees. See id. at 820–22.
33. See Kevin P. Allen, Contractual Fee-Shifting Clauses—How to Determine
“Prevailing Party” Status, 74 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 178, 179 (2003) (“[T]here are exceptions to
the American rule that permit the successful litigant to recover its attorneys’ fees from the
vanquished. Two common exceptions are (1) statutory fee-shifting provisions and (2)
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provisions.34

Fee-Shifting in the Third Circuit

Prior to Fair Wind Sailing, the Third Circuit used a two-step inquiry under
Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act to assess possible attorneys’ fees awards.35
Under Section 35(a), parties could receive attorneys’ fees in exceptional
trademark cases, which required both culpable conduct and exceptional
circumstances.36 Culpable conduct is a threshold requirement and includes
factors such as “bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing infringement.” 37 If the
district court finds culpable conduct, it then considers the circumstances
surrounding the case to determine if the party’s actions constituted an
exceptional finding.38
This exceptional determination is difficult for parties seeking fees to meet;
the court has construed it quite narrowly and has seldom awarded attorneys’
fees—even in cases of intentional misconduct and negligence.39 Applying this
two-step analysis, the Third Circuit occasionally has not awarded attorneys’
fees even after finding a party’s actions were exceptional. 40 Although

contractual fee-shifting provisions.” (footnote omitted)).
34. For a further discussion on the Third Circuit’s two-step analysis for awarding
attorneys’ fees prior to Fair Wind Sailing, see infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
35. See Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2007) (requiring two-step
analysis to determine merits of attorneys’ fees under Lanham Act); Brooks Furniture Mfg.,
Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (detailing Federal Circuit’s
application of exceptional in patent cases), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health
& Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). The two-step process from Green was consistent with
patent cases in the Federal Circuit, which assessed whether the litigation was both “brought in
subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” See id.
36. See Green, 486 F.3d at 103–04 (providing examples of culpable conduct and
objectively baseless litigation). The Third Circuit described culpable conduct as that conduct
which “relate[s] not only to the circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but also to the
way the losing party handled himself . . . .” See id. at 103. In addition, the court further
explained how to assess whether litigation is objectively baseless, listing “closeness of the
liability question and whether the plaintiff suffered damages” as factors to consider. See id.
(citing Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1991)).
37. See id. (listing various factors used to determine whether party engaged in culpable
conduct). However, these factors are “non-exclusive,” because the court has considerable
discretion to determine whether a party has engaged in culpable conduct. See id.
38. See id. (acknowledging several factors that go into exceptional determination).
39. See Salton Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F. Supp. 975, 992 (D.N.J. 1979) (expressing
reluctance to award attorneys’ fees under Lanham Act despite intentional infringement of
trademark rights). Interestingly, the New Jersey District Court in Salton held that the plaintiff
was entitled to attorneys’ fees for intentional infringement of their trademark rights, but not
under the Lanham Act. See id. Instead, the court relied on New Jersey Supreme Court
precedent to award fees under a lower culpability requirement. See id. at 992–93. The court
used this broader standard as a punitive measure to deter companies from infringing on
trademark rights. See id. at 992.
40. See Birthright v. Birthright Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1144 (D.N.J. 1993) (refusing to
award attorneys’ fees because dispute involved two non-profit organizations motivated by
“[p]olitical and social concerns”). In Birthright, the New Jersey District Court held that
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attorneys’ fees provisions are subject to judicial discretion, the Third Circuit has
rarely used this power to discourage meritless, retaliatory, or bad faith claims. 41
2.

All Aboard: Federal Courts Apply Fee-Shifting Provisions in Patent
Cases

Fee-shifting provisions are not unique to trade dress claims, as they are also
used to award attorneys’ fees in patent infringement cases.42 Historically, the
Patent Act has substantially influenced how courts have awarded attorneys’ fees
in trade dress claims.43 In fact, the Third Circuit’s two-step analysis prior to
Fair Wind Sailing was consistent with how other federal courts assess
exceptionality under the Patent Act.44
Despite being enacted in 1790, the Patent Act did not allow for recovery of
attorneys’ fees until 1946, when Congress amended it to include a discretionary
provision based on the court’s addition of the exceptional standard.45 Courts
have possessed the power to award attorneys’ fees since 1946, although they
have rarely exercised it because “[t]hey viewed the award of fees . . . as
appropriate ‘only in extraordinary circumstances.’” 46
defendants were willful and fraudulent in their infringement of trademark rights, but “[w]here
a defendant’s trademark violation occurs in a non-profit, noncommercial context, the equities
favor a denial of an award of attorneys’ fees.” See id. Accordingly, the defendants were
prohibited from using the trademark at issue and ordered to pay back donations they received.
See id. at 1145.
41. See Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Steinman, 466 F. Supp. 560, 564 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(denying attorneys’ fees to plaintiff despite record that might support finding that defendant
intentionally sold goods two months after learning it was prohibited). For other examples of
courts within the Third Circuit that have refused to award plaintiffs attorneys’ fees despite
showings of the defendant’s intentional negligence or misconduct, see supra notes 38–39 and
accompanying text.
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (allowing court to award attorneys’ fees in patent
claims).
43. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014)
(providing historical overview of attorneys’ fees awards in Patent Act claims). The Supreme
Court connected its past reluctance to award fees to a narrow interpretation of what actions
qualified as exceptional. See id.
44. See Owen J. McKeon, Blurred Lines: Third Circuit’s Lanham Act Attorneys’ Fees
Analysis Follows Recent Supreme Court Ruling in Patent Case, GIBBONS IP L. ALERT (Sept.
29, 2014), http://www.iplawalert.com/2014/09/articles/patent/blurred-lines-third-circuitslanham-act-attorneys-fees-analysis-follows-recent-supreme-court-ruling-in-patent-case/
[http://perma.cc/N95T-SBXQ] (“[The Green v. Fornario two-step] inquiry was also
consistent with the standard applied for attorneys’ fees in patent cases under precedent from
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which asked if the litigation was both ‘brought in
subjective bad faith’ and ‘objectively baseless.’”).
45. See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1753 (“Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not
authorize the awarding of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in patent litigation. Rather,
the ‘American Rule’ governed: ‘[E]ach litigant pa[id] his own attorney’s fees, win or
lose . . . .’” (alterations in original)). The amended provision of the Patent Act “add[ed] a
discretionary fee-shifting provision . . . [providing] that a court ‘may in its discretion award
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment in any patent
case.’” Id.
46. See id. (quoting Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir.
1951)) (explaining that courts interpreted “discretionary” very narrowly in awarding
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After the fee-shifting provision was codified in Section 285, however,
courts began to acknowledge and apply it more frequently. 47 For example, use
of Section 285 became increasingly common as federal courts abandoned the
narrow, more limited approach to attorney fee awards in Brooks Furniture
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc.48 In Brooks, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took a more expansive view of
exceptionality and allowed recovery of attorney fees if two criteria were met:
“(1) the litigation [wa]s brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation
[wa]s objectively baseless.”49 The Brooks standard controlled attorney-fee case
law for nine years until the Supreme Court provided a new definition of
exceptional in 2014.50
C. Changing Course: The Supreme Court Redefines Exceptional in
Octane Fitness
In 2014, the Supreme Court found the Brooks standard was “unduly rigid”

attorneys’ fees under previous interpretation). Rather, the fee-shifting provisions evolved
over time as the courts changed the meaning of exceptional and would not become an
“ordinary thing” in patent and trademark cases until decades later. See id. at n.1 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“This provision did ‘not contemplat[e] that the recovery of
attorney’s fees [would] become an ordinary thing in patent suits . . . .’” (alterations in original)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1503, 2 (1946))).
47. See id. (“Six years later, Congress amended the fee-shifting provision and
recodified it as § 285.”). The revised language of the provision instructs that “‘[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.’” See id. at
1752 (alteration in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)). Although the recodification
“did not substantively alter the meaning of the statute” it would be interpreted narrowly in
future cases. See id. at 1753 (noting courts still applied § 285 in discretionary manner
following recodification).
48. 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749
(2014) (creating rigid framework for finding exceptional circumstances in Patent Act cases).
Some factors listed by the court include material inappropriate conduct, willful infringement,
fraud, inequitable conduct, and unjustified litigation. See id. at 1381. Under Brooks, these
factors must be proven by a clear and convincing standard. See id. at 1382 (applying old
standard of exceptional in patent claim).
49. See id. at 1381–82 (providing framework to assess whether case was exceptional in
Federal Circuit patent case). This rigid framework required the plaintiffs to prove both
criteria to win attorneys’ fees. See id. In heightening the standard, the Brooks court provided
some guidance on the application of both requirements. See id. First, a court should presume
that a case was brought in good faith; the improper conduct needs to “be established by clear
and convincing evidence.” Id. at 1382. Second, the objectively baseless requirement “does
not depend on the state of mind of the plaintiff at the time that the action was commenced, but
rather requires an objective assessment of the merits.” Id.
50. See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1751 (“Because the Patent Act does not define
‘exceptional,’ the term is construed ‘in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013))). The Court explained a
new definition, different from that used in Brooks, was appropriate because “as in all statutory
construction, [u]nless otherwise defined, ‘words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.’” See id. at 1756 (alteration in original) (quoting Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and “encumber[ed]” the district courts’ discretion to award attorneys’ fees. 51 In
Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court held that it was more effective to construe
the term exceptional based on its ordinary meaning and found an exceptional
case to be “one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which
the case was litigated.”52 Because exceptional was not actually defined in the
statute, the Court relied on the word’s ordinary meaning in crafting its
interpretation.53 The Court chose to construe fee-shifting provisions broadly to
avoid unwarranted fee awards and allow for more effective use by the district
courts.54
To meet the new threshold requirement established in Octane Fitness, a
court must find “(a) there is an unusual discrepancy in the merits of the
positions taken by the parties or (b) the losing party has litigated the case in an
‘unreasonable manner.’”55 Under this standard, the district court is allowed to
consider the losing party’s blameworthiness. 56 In Octane Fitness, the Supreme
Court provided further clarification to judges and litigators by directing them to
consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether litigation tactics meet the definition
of exceptional in order to merit an award of attorneys’ fees. 57
III.

FAIR WIND SAILING, INC. V. DEMPSTER: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
ADOPTS AN EXPANSIVE DEFINITION OF EXCEPTIONAL AND LEAVES

51. See id. at 1755–8 (rejecting Brooks standard). The Court relied on the plain text of
§ 285 to strike down the two-step approach because the statute “imposes one and only one
constraint on district courts’ discretion to award attorneys’ fees in patent litigation: The power
is reserved for ‘exceptional’ cases.” See id. at 1755–56.
52. See id. at 1756 (determining substantive strength of litigation position requires
consideration of both case facts and governing law). The Court leaves considerable discretion
to the district courts because “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these
determinations” and “equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations
we have identified.’” See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S.
517, 534 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53.
See
Exceptional,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/exceptional [http://perma.cc/8XER-TQLC] (last visited Nov. 5, 2015)
(defining exceptional as uncommon, rare, or not ordinary). The dictionary definition of
exceptional has not changed since 1952, but judicial interpretation and application of the term
has changed its meaning in certain contexts. See, e.g., Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,
764 F.3d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (providing new definition for Lanham Act cases).
54. See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (“[Brooks would] appear to render § 285
largely superfluous.”).
55. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315 (providing framework for new definition of
exceptional under Lanham Act) (citing Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756). However, this
new framework was left to the discretion of the district courts as they have “unparalleled
knowledge of the litigation and the parties.” See id.
56. See id. (“The losing party’s blameworthiness may well play a role in a district
court’s analysis of the ‘exceptionality’ of a case, but Octane Fitness has eliminated the first
step in our two-step test for awarding fees under § 35(a) of the Lanham Act.”). This
elimination obviates an initial finding of culpability. See id. (“Importantly, that discretion is
not cabined by a threshold requirement that the losing party acted culpably.”).
57. See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (explaining “totality of the circumstances”
approach should be used to determine whether litigation tactics are appropriate).
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FRIVOLOUS LITIGATORS HIGH AND DRY
The Supreme Court’s determination in Octane Fitness provided a new path
for attorney fee recovery when the opposing party litigates in an “unreasonable
manner” or brings a meritless claim. 58 Given the high costs associated with
intellectual property litigation, easing the standards for seeking attorneys’ fees
is an important development.59 A few months after Octane Fitness was
decided, the Third Circuit raised the stakes even higher by introducing a new
standard for seeking attorneys’ fees from a different area of intellectual
property.60
In Fair Wind Sailing, the Third Circuit imported the Supreme Court’s
alternative meaning of exceptional to trade dress claims.61 The attorneys’ fees
provision in the Lanham Act directly mirrors the language in the Patent Act,
which allowed the court to easily convey the new meaning.62 The Third Circuit
considered the identical provisions and held that exceptional should be
interpreted broadly under the Lanham Act to allow parties to recover attorneys’
fees based on the merits of the claim and the litigation tactics employed. 63

58. See id. (discussing attorneys’ fees in patent cases); see also Fair Wind Sailing, 764
F.3d at 315 (discussing Third Circuit approach to awarding attorneys’ fees in trademark
claims under Lanham Act).
59. See infra note 60.
60. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 305–06 (applying alternative interpretation of
exceptional to trademark claims under Lanham Act). The Third Circuit took inspiration from
the Supreme Court’s Octane Fitness decision, which redefined exceptional for Patent Act
claims. See id. (“[T]he case controls our interpretation of § 35(a) of the Lanham Act”).
Despite that the Octane Fitness and Fair Wind Sailing decisions dealt with different aspects of
intellectual property, the two courts applied the same definition of exceptional to fee shifting
provisions. See id. (“We believe that the Court [in Octane Fitness] was sending a clear
message that it was defining ‘exceptional’ not just for the fee provision in the Patent Act, but
for the fee provision in the Lanham Act as well.”).
61. See id. at 315 (“We therefore import Octane Fitness’s definition of ‘exceptionality’
into our interpretation of § 35(a) of the Lanham Act. Under Octane Fitness, a district court
may find a case ‘exceptional,’ and therefore award fees to the prevailing party . . . .”); see also
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (providing Patent Act framework for discretional awarding
of attorneys’ fees). The Court in Octane Fitness thought “that an ‘exceptional’ case is simply
one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating
position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” See id. The change
in standard helps to bring some uniformity to decisions regarding attorneys’ fees regardless of
the type of intellectual property case, that is, whether it is a patent, trademark, or copyright
claim. See id.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (allowing attorneys’ fees under Lanham Act). The
statutory text of § 35(a) reads: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.” See id.
63. See Perry Viscounty et al., Ruling Gives IP Fee-Shifting Provision More Teeth,
LAW 360 (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:17 AM),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/ruling-gives-ip-fee-shifting-provision-more-teeth
(indicating that district court’s broad discretion relies on considering totality of the
circumstances). This standard is important for litigators because it “can only be overturned
for an abuse of discretion—the most deferential standard of review and the most difficult to
overturn.” See id.
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A. Facts & Procedure of Fair Wind Sailing

Since 2005, Fair Wind owned and operated sailing schools throughout the
United States and Virgin Islands. 64 In July 2007, Fair Wind hired Larry
Bouffard as a sailing instructor at its St. Thomas location, which exclusively
used catamarans.65 Bouffard signed an employment contract with Fair Wind
that contained a two-year non-compete provision.66
Three years later, Bouffard introduced the company to the defendant, H.
Scott Dempster, and helped Dempster obtain employment as an instructor.67
After a probationary period, Fair Wind chose not to retain Dempster for
performance reasons.68 As a result of this decision, Bouffard left Fair Wind to
open a rival sailing school with Dempster in another part of St. Thomas. 69
Their school, Virgin Island Sailing School (VISS), became a direct competitor
of Fair Wind and allegedly caused Bouffard to violate the non-compete
provision in his prior employment contract. 70 Fair Wind also claimed that
VISS copied several features of its business, including use of 45-foot
catamarans, similar teaching curriculum, procedures for student feedback, and
photographs,
thus
infringing
on
its
trade
dress.71
Following the loss of considerable business and reputation, Fair Wind filed
an action against Dempster and VISS for alleged trade dress infringement under
64. FAIR WIND SAILING SCHOOL, http://www.fairwindsailing.com (last visited Nov. 5,
2015) [http://www.fairwindsailing.com] (detailing that Fair Wind provides sailing schools in
multiple locations around the globe). These locations include Lake Erie, Michigan, the
Bahamas, the Chesapeake Bay, and the Virgin Islands. See id. Despite having several
different sailing schools, the Virgin Islands location is the only school to offer classes using
catamarans. See id.
65. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 306.
66. See id. (noting Bouffard’s non-compete provision precluded him from joining
competitors within twenty miles for two years after termination). Since the land area of St.
Thomas is approximately thirty miles long, the non-compete provision would have effectively
kept Bouffard from working at any other sailing school on the island. See id.
67. See id. (noting Fair Wind agreed to hire Dempster based on Bouffard’s
recommendation).
68. See id. (indicating that Fair Wind placed Dempster on “probationary two-week
period”). Fair Wind chose not to retain Dempster because they were “dissatisfied with
Dempster’s performance.” See id.
69. See id. (“Shortly after Fair Wind terminated Dempster, Bouffard resigned. At or
about this time, however, Dempster and Bouffard decided to open a sailing school together in
St. Thomas.”). The competing company, VISS, was up and running by the following winter.
See id.
70. See id. (“Opening VISS violated Bouffard’s two-year non-compete agreement with
Fair Wind.”). VISS was a direct competitor because, among other reasons, they used the
same type of boats: 45-foot catamarans—something that is unique about the St. Thomas
location of Fair Wind’s business. See id.
71. See id. (noting similarities between VISS and Fair Wind’s St. Thomas location).
Some of these similarities include “us[ing] teaching curriculum and itineraries identical to
those used by Fair Wind,” identical website marketing, and “‘student testimonials’ from
students who took classes with Dempster while he worked for Fair Wind . . . .” See id. In
addition, the VISS website detailed Bouffard’s experience in teaching sailing “presumably in
reference to his time teaching at Fair Wind.” See id.
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the Lanham Act, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment.72 The district
court found that Fair Wind failed to state a claim for either trade dress
infringement or unjust enrichment because the facts did not reach the necessary
level of “precise product features” to make the companies sufficiently similar.73
In addition, the district court found that the complaint did not raise any
allegations that its business features were “inherently distinctive or ha[d]
acquired any secondary meaning.”74 Rather, the district court found that the
product features were “functional” and “beyond the protections of the Lanham
Act.”75
Immediately after the district court’s decision, defendants Dempster &
VISS moved for $41,783 in attorneys’ fees under Section 35 of the Lanham
Act.76 The district court held that a portion of the fees were unreasonably
expended,
but
still
awarded
the
defendants
$36,347.00.77

B. The Third Circuit Throws the Two-Step Standard Overboard and
Extends the Logic of Octane Fitness to Trade Dress Claims
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, but

72. See id. at 307 (indicating several flaws in Fair Wind’s trade dress claim). The court
noted three main “dispositive flaws” in the complaint. See id. First, Fair Wind failed to show
any facts about its business practice that totaled a trade dress claim. See id. Second, the
complaint lacked any “inherently distinctive” features that “acquired any secondary meaning.”
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, Fair Wind’s product features were
“functional” so they were not available for protection from the Lanham Act. See id. at 310.
73. See id. at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry
necessitates precise product features).
74. See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (recognizing that
Fair Wind’s claim failed prong two under Lanham Act analysis). Under the second prong,
“the design [must be] inherently distinctive or ha[ve] acquired secondary meaning . . . .” See
id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding that inherently distinctive trade dress is protected without proof
of secondary meaning); Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1434
(3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing plaintiff’s product as being “inherently distinctive”). The Duraco
court found a product was distinctive because of the “high probability that [the] product
configuration serves a virtually exclusively identifying function for consumers . . . .” See id.
at 1434.
75. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 310–11 (“A functional feature is one that is
‘essential to the use or purpose of the article,’ ‘affects the cost or quality of the article,’ or one
that, if kept from competitors, would put them at a ‘significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.’” (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33
(2001))).
76. See id. at 307 (indicating that defendants sought $41,783 in attorneys’ fees). This
amount was the “total amount of legal fees incurred by Defendants in th[e] matter.” See id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See id. at 312 (explaining why defendants did not receive full amount of attorneys’
fees requested from district court). The district court’s reason for reducing the fees centered
on “excessive billing and vague time entries.” See id.
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reassessed the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to Dempster. 78 Ultimately,
the court concluded “Fair Wind’s claim does not hold water” and remanded the
issue of whether an awarding of attorneys’ fees would be appropriate under the
new standard to the district court.79
1.

Analysis of Trade Dress Claim

In assessing Fair Wind’s trade dress infringement claim, the Third Circuit
found that the company’s trade dress was “a hodgepodge of unconnected pieces
of its business, which together do not comprise any sort of composite visual
effect.”80 For example, the court mentioned that the company’s teaching
curriculum was a non-visual aspect of the business.81
Sensing blood in the water, the court rejected Fair Wind’s last-ditch effort
to save its trade dress claim by focusing on the company’s website. 82 Fair
Wind argued that VISS copied several elements of its website, which taken
together constituted a trade dress violation. 83 This “web design” argument
failed because Fair Wind’s complaint did not discuss the design of its website at
all, but rather made vague comments regarding the identical content placed on
VISS’s website.84 In short, Fair Wind failed to demonstrate how its website
design was victim to any sort of trade dress violation by VISS.85 The court
found Fair Wind’s trade dress to be functional in nature and not business
practice for which protection was available. 86
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit continued to discuss other alternatives that

78. See id. at 314 (explaining that Octane Fitness was decided while Fair Wind Sailing
was on appeal).
79. See id. at 311 (finding that Fair Wind failed to bring proper trade dress claim
because business elements were not protectable under Lanham Act).
80. See id. at 310 (describing Fair Wind’s trade dress claim). Fair Wind claimed to be
harmed because VISS “cop[ied] every material element of Fair Wind’s business and
present[ed] [it to] the public.” See id. (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
81. See id. (explaining possibility that Fair Wind’s curriculum could be part of business
trade dress and failure to indicate any visual impression). The court was unsure if Fair Wind’s
curriculum was “something that [could] be seen” at all. See id. at 310 n.6.
82. See id. at 310 (“Perhaps realizing its failure to plead a cognizable trade dress, Fair
Wind pivoted at oral argument, placing its ‘web design’ at the center of the trade dress
claim.”).
83. See id. (declaring Fair Wind’s complaint void of any mention of website features or
specific elements to satisfy requirement).
84. See id. (listing some examples of website features that might qualify).
85. See id. (noting that Fair Wind failed to include details about its own website in
complaint). The Third Circuit emphasized Fair Wind’s failure to compare VISS’s website to
similar aspects of their own website. See id.
86. See id. at 310–11 (explaining why Fair Wind’s trade dress claim was deemed “not
protectable”).
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might be available to Fair Wind.87 Other courts have determined that limited
protection exists for functional aspects of a business when they “combine to
create something nonfunctional.”88 However, the Third Circuit distinguished
Fair Wind’s case by finding that they “ha[ve] not explained how the identified
functional elements achieve a nonfunctional ‘composite [] of visual effects.’” 89
Fair Wind did not argue its appearance was unique or distinctive in any way
that would deserve protection from potential competitors trying to mirror their
company.90 Instead, the court hinted that Fair Wind was likely aggravated with
VISS for successfully mirroring their company model and competing for
business on the same island.91
2.

Attorneys’ Fees Analysis

Next, the Third Circuit reached the issue of awarding attorneys’ fees under
Section 35 of the Lanham Act and in doing so changed course from their
traditional attorneys’ fees analysis. 92 Drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Octane Fitness, the Third Circuit rejected their prior two-step test in favor of
an expansive, more generous standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to successful
parties.93 The Third Circuit believed the Supreme Court was “sending a clear
message that it was defining ‘exceptional’ . . . for the fee provision in the
Lanham Act . . . .”94 As a result, the Third Circuit applied the alternate
interpretation of exceptional to Lanham Act claims, thus increasing the
likelihood that litigants will recover attorneys’ fees. 95 The Third Circuit
remanded Fair Wind’s case back to the district court level to determine if this

87. See id. at 311 (citing precedent from Ninth Circuit that applies to functional trade
dress claims). For a further discussion of Ninth Circuit precedent and how it applies to trade
dress claims, see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
88. See id.; see also Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1259–62
(9th Cir. 2001) (allowing functional features of business to add up to nonfunctional look).
The court in Clicks found certain elements of a pool hall company to be protectable. See id.
89. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 311 (quoting Clicks, 251 F.3d at 1259)
(distinguishing Clicks as “inapposite” because Fair Wind did not suggest its business was
distinctive).
90. See id. at 309–10 (explaining that only unique business features belonging to Fair
Wind were use of 45-foot catamarans and its teaching itinerary).
91. See id. at 310 (“This claim has little to do with trade dress.”); see also id. at 306
(noting that Bouffard and Dempster opened their sailing school in St. Thomas, in violation of
a noncompete agreement). Upon opening, VISS “copied Fair Wind’s St. Thomas school in
several respects.” See id.
92. For further discussion of the Octane Fitness standard, see supra notes 51–57 and
accompanying text. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (providing statutory text for cases
under Lanham Act). The provision covering attorneys’ fees states that “[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” Id.
93. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 314–15 (detailing Third Circuit’s decision to
adopt Octane Fitness as binding precedent).
94. See id. at 315 (taking direction from Supreme Court’s Octane Fitness ruling).
95. See id. (allowing more discretion for district court to award attorneys’ fees). With
a new definition of exceptional, the court now has more discretion to assess the merits of the
claim by removing a culpable conduct requirement. See id.
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new approach warranted an attorneys’ fees award in this instance. 96
IV.

NAVIGATING CHANNELS FOR RECOVERY: FEE-SHIFTING
PROVISIONS AND MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS IN TRADE DRESS
LITIGATION

Intellectual property litigants rely on possible recovery of attorneys’ fees to
justify engaging in expensive and lengthy litigation. 97 Enabling companies to
defend intellectual property rights is an important purpose given the rapidly
evolving corporate landscape and potential risk of losing customers and profits
during litigation.98 These risks are prevalent in trade dress claims where “the
pressures of ‘[m]ass demand’ and ‘mass advertising’ could quickly erode a
trademark’s value and quality.”99 Thus, the courts need the ability to sanction
frivolous litigators to ensure that intellectual property rights are fully
protected.100
A. Fee-shifting as New Motion for Sanctions in Intellectual Property
Law?
The high cost of trade dress litigation can be offset by several procedural
options for attorney fee recovery. 101 Among these options are motions for
96. See id. (declining to determine whether awarding attorneys’ fees would be
appropriate). The court remanded back to the district level because it has “unparalleled
knowledge of the litigation and the parties . . . .” See id.
97. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 84 C 8075, 1995 WL
221871, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1995) (illustrating substantial time and costs associated
with litigation of trademark rights).
98. See Bijanki, supra note 5, at 813 (noting increase in trademark litigation following
2008 recession). A potential reason for the increase is the “poor economy, which encouraged
companies to be more protective of their intellectual property.” See id.
99. See id. at 815 (alteration in original) (discussing benefits of Lanham Act allowing
litigants to seek attorneys’ fees). The ability to recover attorneys’ fees is important in the
“‘modern’ day—a time when trademarks are increasingly national and pivotal to a company’s
success.” See id. at 814–15.
100. See S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 7136 (1974) (illustrating congressional intent behind
allowing parties to seek attorneys’ fees in trade dress litigation).
Effective enforcement of trademark rights is left to the trademark owners and they
should, in the interest of preventing purchaser confusion, be encouraged to enforce
trademark rights. It would be unconscionable not to provide a complete remedy
including attorney fees for acts which courts have characterized as malicious,
fraudulent, deliberate, and willful. The proposed amendment would limit attorney
fees to ‘exceptional cases’ and the award of attorney fees would be within the
discretion of the court.
Id.
101. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK LITIGATION
TACTICS AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT
COUNTERFEITING 18 n.52 (2011), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigationReport_final_2011April27.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XTMM9CZ] (noting litigation costs will vary depending on amount at issue). The cost of litigation
varies depending on the amount of relief at issue in the case; there is an average cost of
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sanctions and fee-shifting provisions, which allow successful parties to recover
fees for their time and effort and also alleviates the burden of defending trade
dress rights.102
Sanctions against frivolous litigators are available under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.103 A motion for sanctions is appropriate
when the pleading, motion, or other paper is either frivolous or interposed “for
any improper purpose.”104 These two standards, commonly referred to as the
“frivolousness” and “improper purpose” tests, are utilized by courts to consider
the underlying merits and purpose for bringing a claim. 105 However, traditional
sanction inquiries under Rule 11 are materially limited by the safe harbor
provision; fee-shifting provisions are thus typically a more readily available
option for parties seeking attorneys’ fees.106
Unlike sanctions under Rule 11, fee-shifting provisions are driven by
policy considerations, such as fully compensating parties for unnecessary
litigation expenses.107 In contrast, Rule 11 sanctions are focused on
“deterrence and punishment rather than compensation.” 108 Although courts
may use either option to award attorneys’ fees, a motion for sanctions under
Rule 11 does not guarantee absolute recovery because there is “no ‘entitlement

$384,000 when less than $1 million is at issue, compared to an average cost of $1,746,000
when over $25 million is at issue. See id.
102. For a further discussion of sanctions and fee-shifting provisions as avenues for
recovery of attorneys’ fees, see infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
103. See Thomas M. Geisler, Jr., Proof of Violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 and of Sanctions Thereunder, 47 AM. JUR. PROOF FACTS 3D 241, § 1 (1998) (explaining
function of Rule 11 motions for sanctions). Rule 11 sanctions are “intended to deter the filing
of groundless papers in federal litigation [by] insur[ing] that counsel adequately research[es]
both legal and factual allegations . . . .” Id.
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
105. See Robert S. Gerber, Bringing and Resisting Rule 11 Sanctions, 47 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 2D 521, § 5 (1993) (explaining two standards used in application of Rule 11).
Under the “frivolousness” test, the court determines whether a competent attorney
admitted to practice before the district court could reasonably have had a good-faith
belief in the merit of a factual or legal contention after an objectively reasonable
inquiry. Under the “improper purpose” test, the court determines whether the
pleading, motion, or other paper has been interposed for purposes of delay,
harassment, or increasing the costs of litigation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
106. For a further discussion of fee-shifting provisions and their ability to fully
compensate litigants, see infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
107. See Leighton, supra note 6, at 860–61 (describing Commerce Department
argument in favor of allowing fee-shifting provisions). The Acting Commissioner stated that
“[d]eliberate and flagrant infringement of trademarks should be discouraged in view of the
public interest in the integrity of marks as a measure of quality of products.” See id. at 861
(quoting Patent Office Bills: Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 14 (1973) (testimony of Rene Tegtmeyer, Acting Comm’r of Patents,
Dep’t of Commerce)).
108. See Daniel H. Fehderau, Comment, Rule 11 and the Court’s Inherent Power to
Shift Attorney’s Fees: An Analysis of Their Competing Objectives and Applications, 33
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 701, 713 (1993) (discussing purpose of Rule 11).
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to full compensation on the part of the opposing party.’” 109 In many trade dress
claims, “[w]ithout attorney-fee shifting, a company may not pursue a smallscale infringement that would cost the company more to litigate than the
company would recover in damages.”110 However, the ability to receive
absolute recovery through fee-shifting provisions incentivizes companies to
defend their trade dress rights through litigation regardless of the trademark’s
value.111
The ability to recover attorneys’ fees is important and encourages
companies to defend their trade dress rights without being discouraged by cost
of litigation.112 In addition, it is easier to recover under the broad application
of fee-shifting provisions than under Rule 11 sanctions.113 As an initial option,
parties can use fee shifting to recover their losses before employing the more
restrictive standards under Rule 11.114
B. Scallywags Beware: Clients May Seek Recovery Through Malpractice
Claims
A significant downside to incentivizing companies to seek attorneys’ fees
is the heavy burden placed on counsel, whose losing clients may now seek
reimbursement through malpractice claims.115 Due to fee shifting, thousands
109. See id. at 714 (quoting White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 139 F.R.D. 178, 183 (D. Kan.
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 714 n.93 (“[T]he district court on
remand adjusted its initial award of $172,382.19, based on the prevailing party’s attorney’s
fees, down to $50,000.”). As White demonstrates, courts may not give full recovery to
successful parties under a Rule 11 motion for sanctions. See id.
110. See Bijanki, supra note 5, at 815 (explaining congressional intent in providing for
attorney-fee shifting).
111. See S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 7135 (1974) (“In appropriate circumstances, a
successful party should be entitled to full compensation for the injuries sustained and
expenses incurred, since these were necessitated by the acts of the opposing party.”).
112. See id. (illustrating Congress’s policy considerations behind allowing fee-shifting
provisions).
113. See, e.g., Renna v. Cnty. of Union, No. 11-3328 (KM), 2015 WL 93800 (D.N.J.
Jan. 7, 2015) (demonstrating that parties are more likely to get attorneys’ fees under feeshifting provisions than motion for sanctions), report and recommendation adopted by Civ.
No. 2:11–3328 (KM)(MAH), 2015 WL 1815498 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2015). In Renna, the court
allowed recovery even though the losing party did not act in bad faith, fraudulently, or
maliciously, but rather brought litigation that contained “significant disparity in the merits of
the parties’ respective litigation positions . . . .” See id. at *8. Under the Third Circuit’s
analysis, the plaintiff’s continuous litigation on a meritless position was unreasonable. See id.
114. See White, 139 F.R.D. at 183 (limiting recovery of attorneys’ fees under Rule 11
motion for sanctions). The court in White put a $50,000 cap on attorneys’ fees, which reduced
the defendant’s award by $123,000. See id.
115. See 3 S. Gerald Litvin & Gerald A. McHugh, Jr., Legal Malpractice Arising Out
of Civil Representation—Elements of a Cause of Action, PENNSYLVANIA TORTS: LAW &
ADVOCACY § 6.9 (1996) (providing framework for bringing civil malpractice claim). In
Pennsylvania, the requirements for bringing a claim are: “(1) the employment of the attorney
or other basis for imposition of a professional duty; (2) the failure of the attorney to exercise
ordinary skill and knowledge; and (3) proof that such failure was the proximate cause of
damage to the plaintiff.” See id.
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of dollars in litigation costs can potentially fall squarely on the losing parties’
shoulders.116 Most clients will try to avoid paying their opponent’s litigation
bill, and some go so far as to initiate lawsuits against their own lawyer to
mitigate losses from losing their case. 117 To avoid malpractice claims, lawyers
must adequately advise clients on the risk involved and plead the case
accurately to avoid fee-shifting provisions.118
Given the broadening standards of exceptionality, lawyers—especially
those not familiar with the intricacies of fee-shifting provisions—should take
extra precaution before taking cases to recuperate attorneys’ fees. 119 For
relatively new or inexperienced lawyers, seeking out a mentor for advice or
staying abreast on how courts apply fee-shifting provisions under the new
standard are both viable options.120
V.

TOE THE LINE: FAIR WIND SAILING OFFERS GUIDANCE FOR
PRACTITIONERS IN TRADE DRESS CLAIMS

Whether litigating trade dress rights that involve website design or the
packaging shape of shipping materials, a Third Circuit practitioner must
consider the new, broad standards when bringing a claim. 121 Litigants can no
longer hide behind a restrictive view of what culpable behavior qualifies as
exceptional to avoid fee-shifting provisions because now, in light of Fair Wind
Sailing, district courts are more willing to award fees to parties defending
frivolous claims.122 More research is necessary to ensure litigators have

116. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir.
2000) (affirming Third Circuit’s award of attorneys’ fees due to lawyer’s negligent litigation
tactics). The plaintiff’s lawyers were found to have “engag[ed] in bad faith negotiations and
then [sought] to destroy a financially weaker adversary through oppressive litigation tactics.”
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See id. at 282 (“The case involved a deliberate effort by Securacom New Jersey to
‘bury’ Libengood financially and ‘take everything he had’ by filing multiple suits and
complaints against him and his attorneys in a variety of legal fora.”). Due to the lawyer’s
negligent actions, the Third Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees. Id. at 283.
118. For a further discussion of practitioner tips on bringing an effective trade dress
claim, see infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
119. For a further discussion on the broad application of fee-shifting provisions in the
Third Circuit following Fair Wind Sailing, see supra notes 78–96 and accompanying text.
120. See McKeon, supra note 44 (emphasizing need for litigators to stay up to date on
changes within all areas of intellectual property law).
121. See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2014)
(creating expansive standard for awarding attorneys’ in Lanham Act cases). The Third
Circuit’s expansive standard means litigators should consider their actions and specificity of
the pleadings to avoid being stuck paying attorneys’ fees. See id.
122. See Teal Bay Alliances, LLC v. Southbound One, Inc., No. MJG-13-2180, 2015
WL 357064, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2015) (awarding $30,855 in attorneys’ fees to defendant
company). The district court chose to follow the Third Circuit’s lead by adopting the
alternative interpretation of exceptional in trade dress claims. See id. at *1–2.
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adequate knowledge of the case’s facts before initiating suit. 123 Detailed
investigation is important early on in a trademark case to consider the
underlying merits of a party’s position and the strategy of litigation. 124
In order to avoid responsibility for a significant litigation bill, parties
should consider certain characteristics in trade dress, such as functional features
of the business and website design.125 Despite Fair Wind’s shortcomings, its
case offers insight into how litigators should structure their arguments when
bringing trade dress claims in the Third Circuit. 126
A. Stand Off: Functional Versus Non-Functional Trade Dress
Under the first prong of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must establish that the
business’s design or features are non-functional in nature.127 To meet this
burden, the feature must be “unrelated to the consumer demand . . . and serve[]
merely to identify the source of the product [or business] . . . .”128 In contrast, a
functional feature relates “to the use or purpose of the article . . . cost or quality
of the article, [or] one [that] . . . would put competitors at a significant non–
reputation-related disadvantage.”129
123. See id. at *2 (noting court’s assessment that case was exceptional). The court in
Teal Bay Alliances held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff’s claim
was litigated unreasonably. See id. The court relied on evidence that Teal Bay did not have
exclusive rights to use the name “Shorebilly Brewing Company” before the defendant did.
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, even assuming Teal Bay did have some
trademark rights, they “did not establish that [the defendant] would have infringed its rights
by utilizing the name . . . .” See id.
124. See Linex Techs., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 13-159 CW, 2014 WL
4616847, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014) (noting importance of doing factual investigation
before suit is filed). The court in Linex awarded attorneys’ fees after finding that “Linex knew
the limits of the spread spectrum technology that was crucial to the novelty of its patents.
Linex exhibited ‘an overall vexatious litigation strategy’ by continuing to hold these
groundless claims over Defendants’ heads to increase potential settlement amounts.” See id.
at *5.
125. For a further discussion of trade dress characteristics such as functional features
and website design, see infra notes 127–42 and accompanying text.
126. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 308–11 (detailing specific requirements
necessary to prove trade dress claim). Although Fair Wind lost their claim for trade dress
infringement, the case provides an example of the specificity the court looks for in successful
claims. See id. In fact, the Third Circuit made several comments regarding areas that require
greater detail, including website design and lost profits. See id. at 310.
127. See Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 353 (3d Cir. 2003) (“To
establish infringement of its unregistered trade dress a plaintiff must prove that (1) the
allegedly infringing feature is non-functional . . . .”).
128. See Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (listing
common characteristics of non-functional business features). In Prufrock, the court gave
some insight on assessing the functionality of trade dress, finding that “where the feature or,
more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment . . . imitation may be forbidden where
the requisite showing of secondary meaning is made.” See id. (quoting Truck Equip. Serv.
Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217–18 (8th Cir. 1976).
129. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001)
(emphasis added) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (listing characteristics of functional trade dress
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When arguing the functionality of a business feature, it is important to
demonstrate how the feature relates to the source or identification of the
business, rather than the product’s effect on consumer demand or quality. 130
Without this showing, the feature will not be deemed necessary for establishing
the identity of the business, and “the interests in free competition permits its
imitation . . . .”131 By drawing lines between a product’s individuality and its
relation to commercial success, the non-functional requirement promotes free
enterprise and ensures that imitators will not unduly impede on companies that
rely on unique features.132
B. Determining When “Web Design” Crosses the Line into Trade Dress
Territory
With technology rapidly evolving in the business world, trade dress
litigants must adapt and consider potential complications arising in website
design.133 Protecting website design as trade dress of a business can be
difficult because entire design layouts are not protectable, which leaves courts

features). In TrafFix, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff’s trade dress claim
because the product, a dual-spring design, was a functional feature. See id. The Court held
that utility patents are traditionally indicative of functionality, and functionality should be
assessed by whether the product’s design “is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if
it affects the cost or quality of the article.” See id. (quoting Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Having found the spring design to be functional in nature,
the Court barred plaintiffs claim under the Lanham Act. See id. at 23.
130. See Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“Unlike patent law, the purpose of trademark and trade dress law is to prevent
customer confusion and protect the value of identifying symbols, not to encourage invention
by providing a period of exclusive rights.” (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:3 (4th ed. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
131. See Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 133 (quoting Truck Equip. Serv. Co., 536 F.2d at 1217–
18) (stating Eighth Circuit test for assessing functionality of business features). The court in
Prufrock relies heavily on whether the features relate to identification, rather than the
commercial success of the product. See id.
132. See id. (listing several business components that cannot be monopolized). Some
examples of functional features that cannot be controlled include “the usefulness, efficiency,
or appeal of the product or service.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
relied on restaurant examples to demonstrate that certain aesthetic features of a business may
be copied by others provided they do not hinder competition or imitate any distinctive aspects
of the business. See id.
133. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Should It Be a Free for All? The Challenge of
Extending Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of Web Sites in the Evolving Internet,
49 AM. U. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2000) (“In the e-commerce world, a company’s web site
becomes the primary communication center with the customer. The web site is where the
company displays products, presents marketing materials, and provides sales and post-sales
support. Increasingly, companies are spending valuable resources to build and maintain their
web sites.” (footnotes omitted)).
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to interpret the various elements or “feel” of the website. 134 The best argument
in favor of website protection—the distinctive “look and feel” of the website—
has been notoriously difficult for trade dress parties to litigate. 135 As a result,
litigators should still attempt to argue the vague “look and feel” standard, but
remain focused on the individual elements of the website claim. 136
However, some federal courts, including the Third Circuit, offer insight on
how to protect website design under the Lanham Act. 137 For instance, litigants
should provide the court an extensive and detailed comparison of the websites
at issue in the case.138 The website comparison should separately list any
specific similarities in order to demonstrate how these features would confuse

134. See Amber R. Cohen, Note, A Square Peg into a Round Hole: Trade Dress
Protection of Websites, the Perspective of the Consumer and the Dilemma for the Courts, 3 S.
NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 137, 154 (2008) (“Legally, to protect a web page layout
as a whole is not possible with the law as it stands.”). Instead, the courts have focused on the
individual elements of the claim that make the website inherently distinctive. See id. at 158.
135. See id. at 162 (arguing in favor of clearer standards for “look and feel” of website
design).
Upon analyzing the case law, the groundwork to protect the “look and feel” of a
website is not established. The dispositive factors such as consumer confusion,
functionality, and specificity of claims are all infinite yet so limited on a screen of a
computer. Trade dress protection of the ‘look and feel’ of a website has not been
upheld by any court. The law of trade dress does not fit the requirements needed to
protect the ‘look and feel’ of a website. Nevertheless, future cases are imminent
and require an active discussion.
Id. Some commentators have noted the complexity with trade dress claims based on website
design due to the Supreme Court’s reluctance to adapt “in the era of technological
explosions . . . .” See id. at 160.
136. See Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (allowing factual development before deciding on applicability of “look and feel”
standard). The court in Blue Nile came the closest to deciding whether the “look and feel”
standard is appropriate for website design claims. See id. The parties agreed to a stipulation
of dismissal two weeks later and the question was left unanswered. See Blue Nile, Inc. v.
Ice.com, Inc., No. C-06-1002 RSL, 2007 WL 1046368 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2007) (agreeing
to stipulation of dismissal).
137. See Blue Nile, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1246 (demonstrating willingness to apply “look
and feel” standard to trade dress claim). The Blue Nile court held the “presentation of
diamond search features is sufficient to support a claim . . . .” See id. at 1244 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Creative Co-Op, Inc. v. Elizabeth Lucas Co., No. 11-116S-REB, 2012 WL 761736, at *2–3 (D. Idaho Mar. 7, 2012) (declaring parallel claims under
the Copyright Act and Lanham Act are not per se inadmissible). In Creative Co-Op, the Idaho
district court allowed the case to continue forward, but required “a specifically-defined list of
elements that comprise the trade dress.” See id. at *3. Combining Blue Nile and Creative CoOp, it appears that some federal courts are willing to address the “look and feel” argument if
plaintiffs precisely construct the complaint to specifically list the trade dress elements being
copied. See id.
138. See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2014)
(demonstrating what happens when party fails to provide adequate comparison of features).
The Third Circuit struck down the claim because Fair Wind’s “complaint d[id] not enumerate
what specific elements of its website comprise[d] a distinctive trade dress or that its site ha[d]
any distinctive ornamental features.” See id.
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or mislead potential consumers about the business product. 139 Providing
specific examples is extremely important because it is necessary to distinguish
trade dress from copyright rights, which are protectable under a separate
statute.140 Developing a factual basis for the “look and feel” of the website
design based on the individual trade dress elements adds substance to an
otherwise vague standard.141
Finally, although courts have shown a
willingness to protect unique website design features, litigators must plead their
claim early and specifically demonstrate the impact these features have on their
business.142
VI.

CLEARER SKIES ON THE HORIZON

Following Fair Wind Sailing, the expansive view of exceptionality under
the Lanham Act will promote fair and ethical litigation of trade dress claims in
the Third Circuit.143 The more lenient standard for awarding attorneys’ fees
requires litigators to plead their claims precisely, only after an adequate amount
of research verifying the underlying merits. 144 Thus, the Third Circuit took the
wind out of frivolous litigators’ sails by ensuring defendants have an ability to
recover attorneys’ fees.145

139. See Treat, Inc. v. Dessert Beauty, No. 05-923-PK, 2006 WL 2812770, at *15 (D.
Or. May 5, 2006) (“The discreet elements that make up the alleged trade dress must be
separated out and identified in a list.”). In Treat, the court required trade dress elements be
listed out because “[o]nly then can the court and the parties coherently define exactly what the
trade dress consists of and determine whether the trade dress is valid and if what the accused
is doing is an infringement.” See id. at *14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003)
(“Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been ‘careful to caution against misuse or
over-extension’ of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by
patent or copyright.”).
141. See Cohen, supra note 134, at 158 (arguing that websites containing generic
elements may be successful if overall website is proven to be inherently distinctive).
142. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315 (affirming district court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s trade dress and unjust enrichment claims). Failing to provide a detailed complaint,
the court rejected Fair Wind’s trade dress case and did not allow amendment to provide more
specific examples. See id.
143. See LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 444, 463 (W.D.N.C. 2014)
(awarding attorneys’ fees against defendant for litigating trade dress claim unreasonably). In
LendingTree, the defendant “failed to produce relevant documentary evidence” on several
occasions and required several interventions by the court. See id. at 461. Applying the new
meaning of exceptional, the North Carolina district court ruled such behavior was
inappropriate and deserving of punishment by the court. See id. at *461–63.
144. For a further discussion of proper complaint pleadings following the new
interpretation of exceptional, see supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
145. See Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315 (creating broad standard for Third Circuit
to award attorneys’ fees in exceptional cases).
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